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Cargo Preference and Flag Discrimination
in International Shipping-
Actions and Reactions
JAMES R. PATTON, JR.-
F. THOMAS SCHORNHORST**
The major maritime nations of the world are viewing with apprehension and
alarm the merchant fleets being launched by developing countries on the flood
tide of nationalism. The United States Maritime Administration reported that
in "1964 there were 82 independent nations that maintained merchant marines
consisting of from one to 2,656 ocean-going ships of %,ooo gross tons and
over.'
A combination of factors culminate in a nation's desire to establish its own
merchant marine, chief among which are national defense, prestige, protec-
tion against foreign discrimination, and improvement of balance of pay-
ments.2 However, the large capital outlay required for vessel construction or
for the purchase of second hand ships, and the potential for heavy losses
in a highly competitive industry' lead to the adoption of protection and
*Member, District of Columbia Bar. A.B., University of North Carolina; LL.B., Harvard
University.
** Member, District of Columbia Bar. A.B., University of Iowa; J.D., The George Washing-
ton University.
%. Maritime Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven
Countries, issued as Joint Economic Committee, Economic Policies and Practices Paper No. 6,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (Comm. Print -964) [hereinafter cited as Subsidies to Shipping by
Eleven Countries].
2. Ibid.
3. Unlike other industries which involve large capital expenditures, shipping produces
only one product-service-and this intangible item must be sold in one of the most
competitive of all markets. Because a ship is subject to constant overhead, the operator
must seek to keep it continually employed. The more a ship is at sea moving cargo and
the less it is in port loading and discharging cargo, the larger will be the return to the
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promotional measures designed to steer cargoes to national flag vessels.4
Most concerned, and most likely to be affected adversely by this trend, are
the maritime interests of European countries, such as Norway, Denmark, Neth-
erlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Greece-those countries that tradition-
ally have borne a major portion of the world's ocean trade. Although the United
States is sensitive to discrimination against its merchant fleet, its orienta-
tion is more parochial, the primary concern being the maintenance and in-
crease of the United States flag share of its own export and import trade. Con-
versely, European merchant fleets have depended much on world, rather than
national, trade to sustain their operation.
According to one ominous prediction, the ultimate effect of various national
cargo preference and flag quota systems will be the "Balkanization of world
shipping trade."5 But discounting the rhetoric of the advocate, the dangers of
flag discrimination in the international shipping industry are apparent even
to more objective observers:
The adoption of a flag quota by any nation would necessarily lead to a de-
dine of international shipping, retaliation by other maritime states, and pos-
sibly a full scale trade war. Moreover, once the principle of a discriminatory
flag quota, however limited in its application, is accepted, it may be extended
to imports and/or exports of any cargo, or to other services such as cruise
travel and the transportation of passengers, and it could be raised to any per
cent, even one hundred per cent of the state's trade in that cargo. Other mari-
time states would likely retaliate with quotas of their own and trade relations
would disintegrate.6
Developing countries adopting flag quotas and other cargo preference de-
operator on his investment. There are few fixed assets that deteriorate as rapidly and at
so high a cost as an idle ship.
Ibid.
4. It is becoming increasingly difficult for some United States operators to obtain an
equitable share in the cargoes moving between the United States and certain other
nations. One of the important factors is the nationalistic attitude of citizens of certain
foreign nations in the routing of cargo as shown by their strong preference for merchant
vessels flying their flag.
Letter from Donald W. Alexander, Maritime Administrator, to Senator Warren J. Magnuson,
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, March 7, %962, on file at the Maritime Admin-
istration.
[Tihe matter of flag discrimination ... possibly constitutes the biggest single threat to
the overall objective of the Ministers' Resolution, namely, to secure a "free flow of ship-
ping services between nations."
European Shipowners, Memorandum on European Ministers' March 1963 Resolution, in
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 88-24, at 47 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964
House Hearings].
5. Statement on Cargo Preference from A.P. Moller, managing owner of Maersk Shipping
Interests to Maritime Education Committee, in Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee,
Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments, 88th Cong., ist and 2d
Sess., pt. 5, at 1245 (x963-%964). [Hereinafter cited as 1963-1964 Joint Hearings].
6. Inter-American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on the Law of the Flag and Labor
Relations in International Shipping, p. 3, delivered at the annual convention of the Inter-
American Bar Ass'n, May, 1965 [hereinafter cited as Report on Law of the Flag and Labor
Relations].
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vices for their national flag vessels contend they are merely following the
lead of the United States, which has a well-established and internationally
accepted preference system covering government-controlled cargoes. The es-
tablished maritime nations criticize the United States for setting a bad ex-
ample that encourages imitation by the smaller, less developed countries. In
each case, the United States counters that the tonnage covered by its cargo
preference laws is very small-about seven per cent of total United States
ocean-borne trade--and covers only those cargoes financed by the United
States government. Certain countries, say the apologists, have done more than
merely imitate these policies; they have extended national flag preference to
all cargo that can be influenced by the particular government through devices
such as foreign exchange controls, import licenses, and even flag quotas un-
related to government participation.
The divergent attitudes of the well-established maritime nations and the
newly developing countries toward the multiplication of national flags in the
international shipping industry were indicated at a 1964 meeting of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The recommendations pro-
posed by the developing countries were significant in terms of candor if not
logic.
Stress was placed upon the proposition that national merchant fleets were
earners as well as conservators of foreign exchange. The dependence of develop-
ing countries upon established maritime powers for shipping services was de-
plored. A number of proposals for assistance were listed that, in short, urged
countries with established merchant marines to finance more competition in
an industry infamous for cutthroat practices and stabilized largely by inter-
national price-fixing cartels called "conferences." 8 Further, it was recommended
that national merchant marines be insulated from competition through Govern-
ment-sponsored cargo preference measures, and that developed countries resist
the temptation to impose retaliatory measures. 9
The draft recommendation submitted by Sweden' ° and supported by the
major maritime powers took an understandably cautious tack, urging that
impediments to free competition between shipowners be discouraged because
7- Maritime Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Contribution of Federal Aid Pro-
grams to the Oceanborne Foreign Trade of the United States: 1959-62, P. 4 (T964) [hereinafter
cited as Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade]. See text at note 43 infra.
8. Sub-Comm. No. 5, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87 th Cong., 2d Sess., Antitrust In-
vestigations on the Ocean Freight Industry 385-86 (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as
Celler Report]. The reference is to the groups of steamship lines which operate liners, i.e.,
cargo ships traveling over fixed routes, taking almost any kind of cargo and sailing on regular
schedule. See Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 635 (%965).
9. 1964 House Hearings 322.
To. Reprinted in id. at 324-25.
of the dangers inherent in supporting non-competitive merchant fleets by
artificial means." The "Common Measure of Understanding on Shipping Ques-
tions," reached on May 22, 1964, was cast in rather neutral terms, but stressed
that "the question of development of merchant marines by developing coun-
tries should be decided by such countries on the basis of sound economic
criteria.""
Although the United States supported the view expressed in the Swedish
draft, it is in fact wedged somewhere in the middle of the controversy. First,
the United States must defend its own statutory cargo preference system
against attack.'3 Second, it has actively protected the United States flag mer-
chant fleet from foreign discrimination by retaliatory countermeasures.
The purpose of the following discussion is to compare the cargo preference
system of the United States with similar laws and policies of other countries
and to examine the retaliatory mechanisms employed (especially by the United
States) to combat flag discriminations. Although the solution to these prob-
lems may lie in the abolition of cargo preferences in international commercial
shipping,' 4 a pragmatic view of the present system suggests a need for com-
promise instead of polemics. We feel that the formation of regional merchant
marines by developing countries would help establish an economically sound,
competitive industry independent of discriminatory devices. Absent such
steps, however, developing countries can still employ promotional features
with small risk of trade disruption and retaliation by competing maritime
nations.
Cargo Preference Laws of Established Maritime Powers
United States Cargo Preference Laws
An examination of the evolution of cargo preference laws of the United States
is beyond the scope of this discussion,"5 but a summary of these laws and regu-
lations is necessary to appreciate the extent to which foreign governments have
copied or expanded the policies expressed therein. Throughout this discussion,
it will be helpful to keep in mind the congressional attitude toward merchant
marine promotion in the United States:
Obviously, so long as it is assumed that maintenance of a large American
merchant fleet manned by American seamen is essential (a) for purposes of
national defense and (b) for insuring the carriage of American goods in our
i. Id. at 325.
%2. Id. at 3%9.
13. See Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 4; Dep't of State Memorandum Submitted to
the President's Maritime Advisory Committee, Aug. 1965, in Hearings Before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on the Shipping Restrictions on Grain Sales to Eastern Europe, 89 th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1965).
14. See, e.g., 1963-1964 Joint Hearings 1245; Report on Law of the Flag and Labor Re-
lations.
15. See generally Olson, Cargo Preference and the American Merchant Marine, 25 Law &
Contenp. Prob. 82 (196o).
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foreign commerce, Government promotion and support of our merchant marine
will be a prime desideratum of our national shipping policy. 6
Public Resolution No. 17. Public Resolution No. 17, as amended,' 7 states "the
sense of Congress" to be that exports of agricultural or other products fostered
by government loans be carried exclusively in vessels of United States registry
unless it is determined by the Maritime Administration that such vessels are not
available in sufficient numbers, or in sufficient tonnage capacity, or on necessary
sailing schedule, or at reasonable rates.
The major impact of P.R. 17 is directed to shipments financed by the Export-
Import Bank of Washington (Eximbank).18 Eximbank includes in its credit
agreements a requirement that cargo shipments be made in United States flag
vessels unless the requirement is waived by the Maritime Administration.' 9
In certain circumstances, notwithstanding the availability of United States
flag vessels, vessels of the recipient nation may be authorized to share in the
transport of up to fifty per cent of the Eximbank-financed tonnage under "gen-
eral waivers" of P.R. 17, which are usually good for the life of a particular
credit. General waivers are granted only when the Maritime Administration
is satisfied that "parity of treatment" is extended to United States vessels in
the trade of the foreign nation. In making this determination, the Administra-
tion takes into account
the treatment accorded U.S. flag vessels in the trade with the recipient nation,
particularly whether U.S. flag vessels have parity of opportunity vis-a-vis
national flag or other foreign flag vessels to solicit and participate in move-
ments controlled in the foreign nation; parity in the application of consular
invoice fees, port charges and facilities; also parity of exchange treatment in-
cluding the privilege of converting freight collections to dollars as needed.20
If a general waiver is authorized, it applies "only to vessels of recipient
T6. Celler Report z5. The specific purpose of the United States cargo preference laws was
outlined in President Kennedy's Presidential Directive, Regarding Cargo Preference, April
%962, in S. Rep. No. 2286, 8 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (x962):
These statutes. . . are designed to insure that U.S. Government-generated cargoes
move in substantial volume on American-flag vessels. This policy, which is directed to
Government-generated cargoes and which does not control commercial movements of
export-import cargoes, is an important factor in maintaining the merchant fleet necessary
to meet our national goals and is in accordance with the general practice of other mari-
time nations who move the vast majority of their government shipments in vessels of
their own flag.
17. 48 Stat. 5oo (1934), %5 U.S.C. § 6%6a (%964) [hereinafter cited as P.R. 17].
%8. %2 C.F.R. § 402.3(a) (1963).
19. The eligibility requirements for waivers are outlined in Maritime Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statement of Policy on Public Resolution 17, July 24, "959, reprinted in
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 7 F.M.C. 345, 373 (1962), aff'd
sub nom. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. FMC, 321 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2o. Id. at 374.
nation registry to the extent of their capacity to carry the cargo, based on nor-
mal flow of the traffic from interior through ports of shipment and not in ex-
cess of fifty per cent of the total movement under the credit."2 1 Third flag ves-
sels (i.e., of a country other than the United States or the recipient) are bar-
red from competing for Eximbank cargoes unless United States flag vessels
are not available at reasonable rates.
Public Law 664 -The Cargo Preference Act. The Cargo Preference Act of 195422
amended section 9o of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,23 codified various
preferences specified in existing law, 24 and extended their application to other
areas of government involvement.2 5 This law requires that whenever the United
States purchases, donates, or finances any equipment, materials, or commodities,
or guarantees the convertibility of foreign currencies in any of these transac-
tions, the appropriate federal agency must assure that, if ocean transportation is
required, at least fifty per cent of the gross tonnage of such cargo moves aboard
privately owned United States flag commercial vessels "to the extent such ves-
sels are available at fair and reasonable rates. ,,2' The statute is applicable
principally to shipments financed by loans or grants of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) and to shipments of surplus agricultural commodities
and strategic ores and minerals.
2
AID regulations governing commodity loan transactions28 implement the
21. Ibid. The record of tonnage distribution between the United States and foreign vessels
may be based on (i) manifest weight in the case of bulk cargoes such as coal and grain, (z)
ocean freight revenue in the case of machinery, equipment and miscellaneous general cargo
on liner vessels, and (3) such other unit as may be found suitable in exceptional circumstances.
Ibid.
22. 68 Stat. 832 (1954), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 12 4 1(b) (1964).
23. 49 Stat. 2oi5.
24. See Olson, supra note 15, at 84 n.%5, for a listing of foreign aid statutes embodying a
cargo preference rule.
25. H.R. Rep. No. 80, 84 th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (%955).
26. 68 Stat. 832 (%954), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § %24 1(b) (%964). In his April 1962, direc-
tive President Kennedy stressed:
That the purpose of the Cargo Preference Act is to insure that, subject to all provisions
of law, U.S. Government-generated cargoes move in privately owned U.S.-flag com-
mercial vessels whenever such vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates. Section
9 oi(b) requires that at least 50 percent of Government cargoes move on U.S.-flag vessels.
This requirement is a minimum, and it shall be the objective of each agency to ship a
maximum amount of such cargoes on U.S.-flag vessels.
S. Rep. No. 2286, 87 th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1962). [Emphasis added.]
27. See the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (generally referred
to as Pub. L. 48o), 68 Stat. 455 (1954), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1701-09, 172%-24 (1964)
(Titles I, IIJ; 68 Stat. 459 (1954), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1692-97 (1964) (Title III); 73 Stat.
6io (1959), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ %731-36 (1964) (Title IV). For an abbreviated description
of the coverage of the separate tides of this act see Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade,
app. 2, at 15.
28. During fiscal 1963 loan shipments exceeded grant shipments for the first time in the
history of the United States foreign aid program. "The changing emphasis of the AID program
from grant to loan was dearly marked by the 'falling off' of grant shipments from the U.S.
from the FY 1962 total of 4.7 million tons to FY 1963's 2.2 million tons. This change was most
evident in the liner category which fell from 3.46 million tons to 1.44 million tons. The 'loss'
was taken up by loans... ." AID, Cargo Preference Report, AID Financed Shipments a (1963).
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Cargo Preference Act and repeat the fifty per cent rule expressed in the statute.2 9
The act requires AID to "take such steps as may be necessary and practicable"
to assure that the fifty per cent rule is carried out. AID in turn places upon the
borrower or grantee country the responsibility of assuring compliance with
the cargo preference requirements.30A borrower or grantee may receive a waiv-
er of these requirements if AID is satisfied that a United States flag vessel is
not available, or not available at fair and reasonable rates, for a particular
shipment." The waiver enables the shipper to employ a foreign flag vessel,
but AID will not finance the shipping costs as it would in the case of a United
States flag vessel. 2
The fact that AID will not finance delivery services aboard foreign flag
vessels has resulted in the use of United States flag vessels considerably in
excess of the minimum fifty per cent requirement.33 If a particular trade is un-
dertonnaged with the United States flag vessels, AID may grant to the recipient
country a complete waiver of the requirements of the Cargo Preference Act.
In such cases the aid recipient must use its own foreign exchange reserves to
finance ocean transportation unless there are available carriers that will accept
freight charges in local currency.
Department of Defense Shipments. The first cargo preference statute of the
United States provided that ocean transportation of Army and Navy "coal, pro-
visions, fodder, or supplies" must be on United States vessels.34 This statute
survives-albeit in modernized form. 5
29. 22 C.P.R. § 201.5(a) (Supp. 1965). The requirement applies separately for any dry
bulk carrier shipments (tramps), dry cargo liner shipments, and tanker shipments from the
United States, Europe and Africa, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Canada,
and the Far East.
30. Compliance is to be achieved during each United States fiscal year "as well as each
quarterly period thereof." 22 C.F.R. § 2o.15(a) (Supp. 1965).
31. Ibid. Senator Douglas's Joint Economic Committee has taken AID to task for having
failed to make any statutory determination whether U.S.-flag liner rates are fair and reason-
able in light of what the Committee found to be the inflationary effect of the United States
cargo preference laws. Joint Economic Comm., Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the
Balance of Payments, S. Rep. No. i, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 36 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas Report]. See AID's response in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Federal Procure-
ment and Regulation of the Joint Economic Committee, 89 th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-90 (:965).
32. 22 C.F.R. § 2o.15(c) (Supp. %965).
33. AID, supra note 28, at 4.
34. 33 Stat. 518 (1904).
35. 7 oA Stat. %46 (m956), 1o U.S.C. § 2631 (1964), which states,
Only vessels of the United States or belonging to the United States may be used in the
transportation by sea of supplies bought for the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine
Corps. However, if the President finds that the freight charged by those vessels is ex-
cessive or otherwise unreasonable, contracts for transportation may be made as other-
wise provided by law. Charges made for the transportation of those supplies by those
vessels may not be higher than the charges made for transporting like goods for private
persons.
Exclusive use of United States flag vessels is required for shipping "supplies
owned by the Government and in the possession of a Military Department,
or of a contractor, or subcontractor of any tier of a Military Department" and
that are for use of a military department.3 6 With respect to "supplies for the
use of the United States which are contracted for and require subsequent deliv-
ery to a Military Department but are not owned by the Government at the
time of shipment," private United States vessels (if available at fair and rea-
sonable rates) must be employed to transport at least fifty per cent of the ag-
gregate gross tonnage per annum (computed separately for dry bulk carriers,
dry cargo liners, and tankers) .3
Impact of Cargo Preference Laws on United States Shipping
The Maritime Administration reported in 1964 that operators of United States
flag vessels depend upon cargoes subject to preference rules for a major por-
tion of their revenues.3 8 In this the shipping industry concurs.39
In %962, federal aid programs (excluding Eximbank financed movements
and military assistance) represented only about seven per cent of the total vol-
ume (import and export) of the United States ocean-borne trade.40 Out of this
seven per cent of total import and export volume, however, government-spon-
sored aid4l comprised approximately forty-six per cent of the total cargoes car-
ried outbound and inbound by all United States flag ships in 1962.42 If defense
shipments were included, the percentage would rise to fifty-five per cent, and the
portion of total United States ocean-borne trade carried by United States flag
vessels would be about nine per cent.43
The Maritime Administration reports that, during the calendar year 1963,
57.8 per cent of the export cargoes sponsored by AID, Department of Agricul-
ture, and the Inter-American Development Bank moved aboard United States
36. Armed Services Procurement Regs. %-14 o2(i)(A)(ii) (.963).
37. Armed Services Procurement Regs. 1-1 402(i)(B) (1963). See S. Rep. No. 871, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (2964). Another form of statutory cargo preference is found in 76 Stat. 1074
(1962), 46 U.S.C. § 122b(a) (%964):
The Secretary of Commerce shall encourage and promote the development and use of
mobile trade fairs which are designed to show and sell the products of United States
business and agriculture at foreign ports and at other commercial centers throughout the
world where the operator or operators of the mobile trade fairs exclusively use United
States flag vessels and aircraft in the transportation of their exhibits.
38. Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 2.
39. Journal of Commerce, Dec. 31, 1964, p. 9, col. 7: "[lit is pointed out by industry mem-
bers that over half of the freight carried in American flag vessels, including berth liners, is
Government generated aid cargo .... " See also Committee of American Steamship Lines, U.S.
Cargo Preference, Should the United States Government or Foreign Interests Control the Rout-
ing of United States Government Generated Cargo? %6-21 (1965).
40. In -1959 the ratio was 4.6%. Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 4-5. According to
Federal Maritime Commission Chairman Harllee the ratio was down to 6% in %964-%965.
Journal of Commerce, Sept. 3, 1965, p. 11, col. z.
41. Included are movements for the account of the Dep't of Agriculture, AID, Bureau of
Public Roads, and the General Services Administration. Excluded are movements financed by
the Export-Import Bank. Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 5, at table i n.2.
42. Id. at 4. This figure includes tonnages carried in liners, tramps, and tankers. In 1959
the ratio was 25%. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 4.
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flag vessels.44 As to exports financed or administered by AID alone, the total
United States flag portion was seventy-five per cent in 19634" and seventy-
seven per cent in 1964.46
Without government aid and defense shipping programs, the United States
flag tramp and tanker operators could not stay in business. In %962, govern-
ment aid and defense cargoes comprised ninety-six per cent of the total exports
carried by United States flag ships in tramp trades and seventy-four per cent
of the total exports carried by the United States flag tankers.47
Cargo Preference Laws of Other Major Maritime Countries
The laws of the United States requiring use of United States flag vessels in vari-
ous foreign aid programs and other government-sponsored activities are unique
as are the programs to which they are attached. Other major maritime coun-
tries that do not have the massive foreign aid commitments of the United
States (and whose merchant marines operate at comparatively lower costs) do
not generally restrict by law the carriage of government-sponsored or financed
cargoes. In a Maritime Administration summary of shipping subsidies by
other major maritime countries, only France was reported to have a statutory
cargo preference, which required two-thirds of France's crude oil imports to
be carried in French ships or via charter parties approved by the government. 4
The need for cargo preference laws in other major maritime countries is less
44. Letter from Nicholas Johnson, Maritime Administrator, to Senator Warren G. Mag-
nuson, Sept. 25, %963, on file at the Maritime Administration.
45. Ibid. See generally AID, supra note 28, for a breakdown of AID and Pub. L. 480 ship-
ments for fiscal %963. The percentages are well in excess of the required minimum. In fiscal
%963 United States liners refused 276,000 tons of AID cargoes which presumably moved
aboard foreign flag vessels. Id. at table n+.4.
46. Office of Material Resources, Resources Transp. Div., AID, Cargo Preference Report 2
(1964).
47. Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 4-5. United States Flag liners, which in many cases
received operating subsidies, relied on aid cargoes for about half of their liftings during 1962.
ibid.
48. Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven Countries 5, 9. Countries reported on were Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and the United States. But see Committee of American Steamship Lines,
supra note 39, at 3-4:
Nations with maritime-centered economies, including but not limited to insular pow-
ers such as Great Britain and Japan, must espouse the open sea lane as a trading image
before the world and restrain themselves from restrictive legislation. However, they pos-
sess an even more powerful weapon in the nationalistic influence which emanates from an
economy directly wedded to world shipping. In such countries the strength of the nation,
the livelihood of the people, the health of industrial enterprise, and even the preservation
of basic institutions is interwoven with the urgent need to support expansive maritime
interests.
acute because of the relatively large percentage of their foreign trade carried
by national flag ships as compared to the United States.49
In communist countries, a state agency replaces the private importer and
exporter. Control of cargo routing is maintained by exporting c.i.f. or c. &
f., and importing f.o.b. This enables the state to designate the carrier; natu-
rally, vessels of the communist bloc are preferred.
Criticism of United States Cargo Preference
The major maritime countries are the most vociferous opponents of United
States cargo preference; the Maritime Administration, however, stresses that
in 1962 foreign flag ships were able to compete for ninety-six per cent of the
tonnage that moved in the import and export trade of the United States and
that they actually carried over ninety per cent."0 Foreign shipping interests
nevertheless object strongly to the United States cargo preference laws, argu-
ing that such policies set a bad example that ultimately may destroy free
competition in international shipping.51
A report recently submitted to the Inter-American Bar Association suggests
that any restrictive flag quota violates Article XI of the General Agreement
49. It is also interesting to note the percentage of the total United States ocean-borne trade
(import and export) carried by these foreign flag ships:
Per cent of own country's Per cent of U. S. ocean-
ocean-borne foreign trade borne foreign trade
Flag of Vessel (import and export) (import and export)
1962 1964
Denmark 23 (1963) 1.8 1-5
France 59 (1962) Not reported t.2
West Germany 37 (1962) 3.3 3.3
Greece 47 (1963) 6.8 4.9
Italy 33 (1962) 3.8 4-7
Japan 46 (196z) 2.9 3.1
Netherlands 16 (1963) 3.1 2.3
Norway 43 (1962) i6.o %6.6
Sweden 33 (%963) 2.5 2.6
United Kingdom 52* (%962) 7-3 7.2
United States 8.9 8.3
*Excludes Swedish iron ore exported through Narvik. The ratio was 28% including ore
shipment.
-Net tonnage of vessels with cargo.
This chart is compiled from Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven Countries 9; Contribution of
Federal Aid to Trade 4; and Maritime Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Participation
of Merchant Ships, By Flag of Registry, in the Commercial Oceanborne Foreign Trade of the
United States, By Type of Service, Aug. 1g, 1965, p. %.
It should be noted that the percentages of total cargoes carried by American flag vessels
take into account all vessel categories-liner, tramp, and tanker. If cargo in the liner category
is considered separately, the statistics would indicate that approximately 30% of such cargo
moves on United States flag ocean liners. See Contributions of Federal Aid to Trade 4. See
also Committee of American Steamship Lines, Facts About Our American Merchant Marine
28 (1964). As noted above, about half of that 30% is United States Government sponsored
or financed. The industry prefers to state the United States flag liner portions as 37% based
on revenues rather than tonnage. See e.g., Committee of American Steamship Lines, supra
note 39, at 2%.
50. Contribution of Federal Aid to Trade 4.
51. z963-1964 Joint Hearings, Pt. 5, at 1247-48.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 52 as well as the spirit of many bilateral treaties
of friendship, commerce, and navigation."3
Rumblings within the United States Congress and the Administration in-
dicate that statutory cargo preference is due for critical analysis. In his State
of the Union Message delivered to Congress on January 4, 1965, President
Johnson promised a "new policy for the merchant marine."54 An Interagency
Maritime Task Force was established to study the problems of United States
merchant shipping and to recommend modifications of existing government-
supported maritime programs. The Task Force report was "leaked" to the press
in September 1965, before being submitted to the President's Maritime Advi-
sory Committee. It called for a complete overhaul of United States policy, in-
cluding major revisions of labor policies, operating and construction subsidies,
and the gradual elimination of cargo preference with respect to liners as well
as bulk carriers."' Bitter opposition to the recommendations developed among
United States flag operators and leaders of maritime labor. The leak of the
"unofficial" report may well have been an Administration trial balloon to
gauge public response before committing itself to a definite program. If so,
the balloon exploded. The Maritime Advisory Committee, composed of non-
government representatives of shipping management and labor and the gen-
eral public, refused to accept the recommendations and announced it would
submit its own proposals to the President.5"
The Joint Economic Committee, headed by Senator Paul Douglas, likewise
has criticized United States cargo preference, but for its administration rather
than its underlying policies. The Committee suggested that the harmful infla-
52. Report on Law of the Flag and Labor Relations 9. Art. XI of GATr, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3z-
A3 3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. %7oo, reads in part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
53. Report on the Law of the Flag and Labor Relations Ei.
54. %%x Cong. Rec. 29 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1965). For example, cargoes generated by the United
States cargo preference laws represent the only form of government subsidy received by
operators of United States flag bulk carriers. In this respect the Maritime Administrator has
termed cargo preference a "miserable failure" due to the lack of provisions for replacement
of obsolescent tonnage and the cost to the United States of $8o million a year in payment of
non-competitive bulk freight rates. Address by Nicholas Johnson to National Security Com-
mission of the American Legion, in Washington, D.C., March 30, %965. The industry takes a
different view: "That cargo preference has not succeeded further in developing a competitive
fleet stems not from the laws but from failures in their administration." Statement by Max
Harrison, President of the American Maritime Ass'n, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 13, 1965,p. 4A, col. 5.
55. Interagency Maritime Task Force, The Merchant Marine in National Defense and Trade
-A Policy and a Program, Oct. 4, %965.
56. Wall Street Journal, Oct. %%, 1965, p. 8, col. 3.
tionary effects of higher freight rates seemingly generated by the cargo prefer-
ance laws may outweigh the benefits to the American merchant marine and
balance of payments. 57
It is unlikely that Congress will in the foreseeable future repeal any of the
cargo preference laws regarded as "this eminently fair '50 per cent for you,
50 per cent for me' policy" by the highly persuasive shipping industry lob-
by"8 and by maritime labor groups.
Retaliatory Devices Employed Against Flag Discrimination
Closely related to the concept of governmental promotion are the various
means of protecting a national merchant marine from foreign discrimination.
Here again the United States has assumed the leading role with a variation on
the "big stick" policy. Below are described the means of combating discrim-
ination in international shipping. Specific instances of United States use of
these weapons are outlined in the next major section.
Retaliatory Devices Used by the United States
Initially, relief from alleged discrimination against the United States flag vessels
is sought through diplomatic negotiation. If the discriminating government
participates in Eximbank credits, however, general waivers of P.R. 17 may be
denied pending restoration of "parity of treatment" to United States flag ves-
sels. Failing a solution at the conference table, and if denial of P.R. 17 waivers
has no remedial effect, the United States, through the Federal Maritime Com-
mission (FMC), may resort to a power granted by section 19(i) (b) of the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 192o, whereby the FMC is authorized
To make rules and regulations affecting shipping in the foreign trade not
in conflict with law in order to adjust or meet general or special conditions
unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade, whether in any particular trade
or upon any particular route or in commerce generally, and which arise out of
or result from foreign laws, rules, or regulations or from other competitive
methods or practices employed by owners, operators, agents or masters of
vessels of a foreign country .... .9
The FMC and its predecessors have issued offsetting regulations pursuant to
the statute only twice since the date of its enactment.60
In 196o, the Federal Maritime Board (now Commission) first adopted gen-
57. Douglas Report 33.
58. Committee of American Steamship Lines, supra note 49, at 28. See also the Committee
of American Steamship Lines's latest and most comprehensive defense of cargo preference,
supra note 39.
59. 41 Stat. 995 (192o), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 876(z)(b) (1964). See also § 26 of the
Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 737, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 825 (%964), which requires the
FMC to investigate and report to the President any foreign discrimination against United
States vessels. If the President cannot reach a solution via diplomatic action, he is to advise
Congress "if deemed important in the public interest, in order that proper action may be
taken thereon."
6o. See text at notes "%4-20 infra for a complete discussion.
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eral regulations dealing with foreign government discrimination against United
States vessels."' To the extent discriminatory fees and charges are imposed
on United States flag vessels by a foreign government, the United States will
impose offsetting fees and charges on the vessels favored by the discriminat-
ing foreign government.62 Also, if "other discriminatory practices" exist
against United States flag vessels, appropriate offsetting regulations will be
imposed."3
As one of the results of the 1964 shakeup catalyzed by Senator Paul Douglas
and the Joint Economic Committee, the FMC has promised an active role in
ferreting out and eliminating foreign discriminations against American flag
ships. 4 The FMC's new found boldness derives from four years of congres-
sional investigation and criticism that concluded that the predecessors of the
present Commission had not discharged their statutory responsibilities."5 The
"new" Commission is trying very hard to remove this stigma and is assuming
a militant pose for the benefit of its critics.
A detailed statement approved by the Commission on March 9, 1964, an-
nounced the establishment of an Office of International Affairs charged with
keeping an eye on foreign discriminations.66 The Commission listed various
forms of discrimination that might call for remedial action pursuant to sec-
tion 19 (i)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 192o:
(c) Lower port dues and charges for national flag vessels; (2) Preference in
berthing given to national flag ships; (3) Ship taxes remitted or reduced for
national flag ships; (4) Steamship lines must employ special brokers for en-
tering and clearing ships-national-flag carriers exempt;67 (5) Government
6%. 46 C.F.R. §§ 5o6.1-5o6.3 (Supp. %965).
62. 46 C.F.R. § 506.2 (Supp. %965).
63. 46 C.F.R. § 506.3 (Supp. %965).
64. This agency is . . . energetically engaged in the removal of foreign discriminations
against our merchant marine which have the effect of reducing its revenues, thereby
reducing the dollars earned by these companies which would otherwise contribute to a
favorable balance-of-payments position.
Letter from FMC Chairman Harlee to President Johnson, May 2o, 1964, on file at the Federal
Maritime Commission.
65. Douglas Report 2o. "For a period of almost 45 years, lethargy and indifference have
characterized its attitude, laxity and inefficiency its procedures, and frustration and in-
effectiveness its administration of the regulatory features of the shipping acts." Celler Report
359-6o.
66. FMC, The Program of the Federal Maritime Commission-Priorities and Objectives, in
1964 House Hearings 73o, 753.
67. This is a reference to a requirement in French ports dating from 161o requiring
vessels other than those of French registry to employ courtiers maritime (maritime brokers
or agents) for entrance, clearance, translation of documents, and other associated services.
Use of such brokers is not compulsory with French ships. United States ship operators have
objected to the practice as unnecessary and expensive. It is also felt that the use of these
brokers could aid competitors in gaining confidential shipping information. The United States
Government has objected rather mildly to this practice. Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., Discriminatory Practices and Laws of Foreign Nations Adversely Affecting
assesses a surcharge against goods when shipped on a foreign-flag ship but
not if shipped via national flag; (6) All cargo required to be booked through a
Government board or agency-opportunity to favor national-flag carriers;
(7) All purchases of certain imports required to be made through a Govern-
ment agency-such goods then routed via national flag under the guise of
"Government cargo"; (8) Special benefits given by Government such as remis-
sion of import duties or granting of favorable rate of exchange on condition
that shipment is made by national-flag carrier; and (9) A specified percentage
of a country's foreign trade is reserved for carriage by national-flag vessels-
implemented by import and export licenses and permits.68
As a practical matter, no action is likely to be taken under section 19(i)(b)
in response to discrimination unless the Commission receives a complaint
from an American flag carrier.
Singled out as the most harmful discriminations are "those which artificially
divert cargoes to national-flag carriers and prevent U.S. flag carriers from
freely participating in the carriage of goods" 69-a somewhat paradoxical state-
ment since the effect of the United States cargo preference laws is to artificially
divert cargoes to national flag carriers and prevent non-United States flag car-
riers from freely participating in the carriage of the diverted goods. The point
is often stressed that reservation of cargoes to vessels of the United States
applies only to non-commercial cargoes that "would not exist except as pur-
chases for account of the United States, or as aid or United States financed
cargoes, with 'financing' ofttimes approaching the outright gift category., 70
However, AID points out in its Cargo Preference Report for fiscal 1963 that
loan shipments now represent the largest portion of our foreign assistance
program.71 Moreover, the United States has extended the application of fifty-
fifty cargo preferences to commercial wheat sales to the Soviet Union and other
Iron Curtain countries.72 This concession was granted by President Kennedy
under pressure from maritime labor groups and has been a source of irritation
to United States wheat dealers who claim the high cost of shipping wheat
via United States flag vessels has precluded them from supplying this market.
In October 1965, after two days of hearings, a majority of the members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged President Johnson to remove the
restriction. 78
United States Flag Shipping (Comm. Print %962). See also Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven
Countries 9 n.io.
68. 2964 House Hearings 753-54.
69. Id. at 754.
7o.S. Rep. No. 2286, 87th Cong., 2d Sess..1 (%962).
71. AID, supra note 28, at 2. Grant shipments dropped over 50% from fiscal 1962 to 1963.
The shift from grant to loan cargo is played down in AID's report covering fiscal x964 where-
in it is observed, "Cargo is cargo from the ship's point of view." AID, Cargo Preference Report
% (1964). It is perhaps becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to defend cargo
preference on the "gift" theory.
72. 15 C.F.R. § 3 73 .5 (b)(3) (Supp. 1965).
73. Letter from Senate Foreign Relations Committee to President Johnson, Oct. 7, :E965.
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European Reaction
In sharp contrast to the United States where regulation of ocean trade has been
well established for nearly fifty years, European countries have been reluctant
to interfere with international shipping. However, European ship-owners facing
the possibility of a constricted market due to the spread of cargo preference
and other forms of flag discrimination are now demanding countermeasures
in the form of government sanctions against ships of the discriminating na-
tions.74 European governments are reluctant to initiate retaliatory action pos-
sibly because they fear the effects of such a response on their over-all trade.
Nevertheless, some limited steps have been taken by European governments
to control discrimination against their vessels. For example, Germany and
Italy restrict use by their nationals of ships of countries that discriminate
against German or Italian ships."6 A seldom, if ever, used British statute (dat-
ing to the nineteenth century) authorizes the Sovereign to retaliate when British
ships are subjected to discrimination in foreign ports and to impose countervail-
ing duties against ships of a country that exacts like penalties from British
ships.76 A recently promulgated French decree authorizes the government to re-
taliate in answer to discriminatory measures instituted by a nation against the
French flag. 7 Although none of these measures has yet to be enforced effective-
ly, European maritime nations have thereby served notice to developing coun-
tries with maritime ambitions that there is a point beyond which flag discrimi-
nation will not be tolerated. The United States has already given dear indica-
tion of its limited patience with discriminatory cargo preference systems; in
doing so, however, it is finding its own preferences increasingly difficult to
defend.
Cargo Preference Laws and Policies of Foreign Governments and
the Response of the United States
The following examples illustrate devices employed by foreign governments
to promote use of their national merchant marines; these devices have been
found by the United States to be discriminatory to its shipping interests.
The Brazil Case
Import Trade from the United States. On April 24, c959, the Brazilian Su-
74. European Shipowners, Memorandum on European Ministers' March i963 Resolution,
in 1964 House Hearings 47.
75. Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven Countries 11, 14.
76. Customs Consolidation Act 1853, %6 & 17 ViCt. c. 107, §§ 324-25.
77. Ministers Des Travaux Publics et Des Transports, Decret No. 65-6%z du 22 Juillet 1965,
Journal Officiel du 28 Juillet 1965, p. 66o.
perintendency of Money and Credit published an instruction (designated
SUMOC :8i) that stressed the importance of conserving foreign exchange.
Pursuant to this instruction, the government subsidized the importation of
goods essential to the Brazilian economy by granting preferential exchange
rates to its importers.78 The Brazilian Government assured cargo to its national
flag line by requiring importers utilizing the favorable exchange rates to
specify shipment aboard vessels of the national flag. An exception was allowed
for shipments subject to United States cargo preference, but there was no pro-
vision whereby United States flag carriers could compete for cargoes that were
purchased in the United States with Brazilian government foreign exchange sub-
sidies, but were not subject to United States cargo preference laws.
On November :12, 1959, the President of Brazil issued Decree No. 47.225,
which required that imports financed or otherwise subject to "government
favors" be shipped aboard vessels of the Brazilian flag unless a waiver of that
requirement was first secured from the Brazilian Merchant Marine Commis-
sion.7 9
At the time of this decree, only two United States flag liner services were
operating in the southbound trade from the United States to Brazil: Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. (Mooremack) from Atlantic ports, and Delta Steam-
ship Lines, Inc. (Delta) from Gulf coast ports. Both lines protested SUMOC
181, alleging artificial diversion of cargo to Lloyd Brasileiro. They objected
also to Decree No. 47.225 since a waiver by Lloyd of restricted cargo to be
shipped from the United States was not necessarily in favor of a United States
flag vessel, but was a general waiver that permitted the shipper or importer
to select a vessel of any registry.
Pending clarification of Brazil's intention vis-a-vis United States flag ves-
sels, general waivers of P.R. 17 were withheld by the Maritime Adminis-
tration. O Representatives of the American shipping lines began negotiations
with Lloyd and representatives of the Brazilian Government, attempting to
persuade Brazil to amend SUMOC 181. to embody an equivalent of the gen-
eral waiver policy of the United States under P.R. 27.81 However, the Brazil-
ians concluded SUMOC 181 would not be amended to provide the sort of
"reciprocity" desired by the American flag lines (and apparently encouraged
78. The instruction is reprinted in translation in Initial Decision, River Plate and Brazil
Conferences v. Lloyd Brasileiro, FMC Docket Nos. 921, 928, Exhibit 3B, Aug. 6, 1964, as
adopted by the FMC, May 25, 1965 [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision].
79. See Initial Decision at 7. For purposes of this decree, ships chartered by Brazilian
firms in accordance with the provisions of the decree were to be considered ships of the
Brazilian flag. The same was true of SUMOC 181.
80. Initial Decision at 7.
81. In a letter to Chairman Stakem of the FMB (now FMC) dated June %8, %959, filed as
Exhibit B in FMC Docket Nos. 92%, 928, officers of Mooremack and Delta who had been
negotiating with the Brazilian Government and Lloyd reported:
It is further understood and tentatively agreed that the Brazilian Government will amend
SUMOC Instruction 181 to provide that all Brazilian subsidized cargoes shall be trans-
ported in Brazilian flag vessels, except that waiver will be granted (by the Brazilian
Government) to vessels of the flag of the participating nations, enabling such vessels to
participate in up to 5o percent of such movements.
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by the Department of State). Moreover, the Brazilians perceived no bargain
in the suggestion that they parallel P.R. 17 since they controlled or influenced
far more cargo through their exchange subsidy program than they stood to
lose as a result of not being eligible for the carriage of Eximbank cargoes.
Failing a governmental solution, Lloyd and Mooremack negotiated a pool-
ing agreement to relieve the alleged discriminatory effect of SUMOC :8t and
its related decrees. Delta participated in the negotiations, but could not come to
terms with Lloyd. On October 15, 196o, Lloyd and Mooremack executed the
agreement and submitted it to the Federal Maritime Board for approval pursuant
to section 15 of the Shipping Act of 19c6. 2
Generally, the agreement covered the pooling of revenue on
All cargoes that [Lloyd and Mooremack] carry imported into Brazil and trans-
ported [by the parties on owned or chartered vessels from any port or point
on the Atlantic Coast of the United States from Maine to Key West inclusive,
and destined to any port or point in Brazil], whether controlled and subsidized,
or commercial cargoes.83
The carriers also pledged themselves to do everything possible through ap-
propriate channels of their governments (i) to assure that Mooremack carried
those cargoes that could not be carried by Lloyd and (2) to assure that Lloyd
carried those cargoes that could not be carried by Mooremack.
s4
On May 2z, i96z, nineteen months after the execution of the Lloyd-Moore-
mack pooling agreement, the Brazilian Merchant Marine Commission issued
Resolution No. 2216, which established a priority system for carriage to Bra-
zil of commodities from the United States. Shipment was to be made aboard
Brazilian flag vessels if available. If none were available, then shipment was
to be made aboard a United States flag vessel; only in cases where there was
82. 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (x964). Section 15 of the Shipping Act pro-
vides machinery for legalizing anticompetitive agreements between carriers which agree-
ments would ordinarily be illegal under the antitrust laws of the United States. See Isbrandt-
sen Co. v. United States, zz F.zd ,5 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). Pursuant
to § %5, a common carrier by water must file immediately with the FMC a copy of every
agreement with another carrier which provides, inter alia, for the fixing or regulation of
transportation rates or fares; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition;
pooling or apportioning earnings, losses or traffic; or in any manner providing for an ex-
clusive, preferential, or cooperative working agreement. If, after notice and hearing, the FMC
finds the agreement to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, ex-
porters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be
contrary to the public interest, the agreement will be disapproved by the Commission. How-
ever, if the agreement is not objectionable on any of the aforementioned grounds, it must be
approved by the Commission. Only after express approval may the matters agreed upon be
implemented. 46 C.F.R. § 522.4 (Supp. 1965).
83. Agreement No. 8545 art. 2, in Initial Decision at 4.
84. Agreement No. 8545 art. .5, in Initial Decision at 5.
neither a Brazilian nor an American vessel available could shipment be made
aboard a ship of a third nationality.85
The revised policy of the Brazilian Government was not the equivalent of
the United States Maritime Administration's interpretation of P.R. 17; the
latter allows the recipient nation's vessels to carry up to fifty per cent of the
cargoes financed by Eximbank. 86 The Brazilian concession was not entirely
satisfactory to the United States; but coupled with the Lloyd-Mooremack
pooling agreement, the Maritime Administration and the Department of State
were willing to accept the compromise pending future objections by United
States flag carriers.8 7 Delta, although not a party to the pooling agreement, re-
ceived the benefit of any waiver of cargo by Lloyd to United States flag vessels
at United States Gulf ports.
Competing "third flag" shipping lines with ships registered elsewhere than
the United States or Brazil (and members of the River Plate and Brazil Con-
ferences to which both Lloyd and Mooremack belong) did not take such a
philosophical view of the pooling agreement and brought action against the
two "national flag" carriers before the FMC.55 Among other things, the third
flag carriers argued that the pooling agreement was designed to drive them
from the trade by depriving them of cargo-particularly since the agreement
covered not only government-controlled cargo, but also commercial cargo that
would be jointly solicited by the national flag lines. The complainants did
not quarrel with the right of nations to control the routing of noncommercial
cargo.
The Commission found that the provisions of the pooling agreement calling
for joint solicitation of commercial cargo by Lloyd and Mooremack (which
cargo comprised about sixty-five per cent of the total trade) rendered the agree-
ment subject to disapproval.89 It was indicated, however, that if commercial
85. Initial Decision at 7.
86. The unreserved 50% of AID or Pub. L. 480 cargoes may be transported on a vessel of
any registry (except Sino-Soviet bloc), and in cases where United States flag vessels are not
available for reserved cargoes, waivers may be obtained to transport such cargo via foreign
flag. In such instances, AID will usually prefer to issue such a waiver in favor of the recipient
country's vessels. Olson, Cargo Preference and the American Merchant Marine, 25 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 82, 99 (%96o). Neither the Cargo Preference Act, 68 Stat. 832 (1954), as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 124%(b) (-1964), nor AID regulations require "parity of treatment" for
United States flag vessels before granting waivers for shipment via foreign flag vessels.
87. The Maritime Administration reported to Congress that
ITlhere has been a complete revamping of Lloyd Brasileiro recently. In the light thereof
and the fact that the pooling agreement, if approved, would, in the opinion of the United
States operator represent a solution to the shipping problem no further action would
seem to be required at this time.
Letter from Donald W. Alexander, Maritime Administrator, to Senator Warren G. Magnuson,
March 7, 1962 (enclosure).
88. River Plate and Brazil Conferences v. Lloyd Brasileiro, FMC Docket No. 921. The pro-
ceedings were consolidated with FMC Docket No. 928 which had been instituted by the
FMC to examine Agreement No. 8545. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., the Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleans, and the Mississippi Valley Association intervened to protest the
diversion of cargo from Gulf to Atlantic ports which, they alleged, would be the consequence
of the Lloyd-Mooremack pool.
89. Initial Decision at 16.
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cargo were eliminated from the scope of the agreement, it would be approved
by the Commission. With respect to the admission of "third flag" carriers to
the pool, it was observed candidly: "Third flag carriers cannot be of the same
value to Lloyd as can Mooremack under the policies of Public Resolution No.
-//.90
17.19
Export Trade to the United States-The Coffee Pool. Prior to 1959, rate cutting
and secret rebates characterized the coffee trade between Brazil and the United
States. The conference serving the trade devised a pooling agreement91 to stabi-
lize the situation. Generally, the agreement allotted certain percentages of the
trade to the pool members, required certain minimum sailing schedules, and pro-
vided that, to the extent a participant carried more than its allotted share of
coffee, it would make certain payments to the "pool" that would then be paid to
any participants who undercarried their share during the applicable period. Not
all conference members were represented in the pool-particularly Northern
Pan-America Line (Nopal), which eschewed the pool because of the low per-
centage allocation it was offered relative to its past liftings.
Carriers participating in the coffee trade were generally regarded by the
conference as either "national flag" or "third flag" carriers. A carrier was
considered "national flag" if it flew the flag of the country of origin or desti-
nation of the coffee (Brazil or the United States), or if the carrier was a govern-
ment-owned line of a South American country within the conference trading
limits (Brazil, Uruguay, or Argentina). Nopal operates Norwegian flag vessels
and was therefore considered a "third flag" carrier.92
After Nopal's refusal to join the first pool, it continued lifting coffee at
Brazilian ports. On October 13, 196o, the Brazilian Superintendency of Money
and Credit issued a decree designated SUMOC 2o2 that restricted to members
of the conference and to signatories of accords or agreements within the confer-
ence, the shipping of Brazilian export products destined for the United States or
Canada.93 In short, Nopal would be banned from the Brazilian coffee trade un-
less it joined the pool. Nopal began negotiations with pool members over terms
of entry. Lloyd Brasileiro refused to accept a lesser allocation than Nopal even
9o.Id. at t9.
91. See Northern Pan-American Line v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., FMC Docket No.
%o96, July 2o, 1964. Actually these were separate pools for carriers serving United States At-
lantic ports and United States Gulf ports. The controversy centered around the Gulf pool, but
members of the Atlantic pool intervened.
92. Nopal was the only "third flag" line in the Gulf pool, and "third flag" members of the
Atlantic pool were Brodin Line (Swedish), Columbus Line (West German), Ivaran Lines
(Norwegian), Holland Pan-American Line (Dutch), and Norton Line (Swedish).
93. Report of the Commission, Northern Pan-American Line v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., FMC Docket No. io96, July 2o, 1964, p. 1o (transl.).
though Lloyd could not match Nopal's lifting capacity. Lloyd held the trump
card as well as the aces since without Lloyd there could be no deal.
Delta Steamship Company (United States flag) proposed that allocation of
percentages be based on "previous experience over a representative number of
years, with due weight to pioneering effort" and national interest, meaning
that Lloyd, "as an instrument of policy of the Brazilian Government, should
receive special consideration on the basis of both national interest as well as
its position as the oldest carrier in the trade." 94
Final "negotiations" resulted in equal allotments to Lloyd and Nopal. No-
pal was not satisfied with this allotment, but decided to wait until August 29,
"r962, when the agreement expired and the percentages and minimum sailings
would "be subject to review and adjustment taking into consideration the
service and carryings during the past two (2) year period." 5 However, the
effective period of the agreement was extended (with Nopal's reluctant con-
sent) to February 28, 1963.
When the carrier representatives met in early E963 to discuss coffee alloca-
tions, Nopal proved that its coffee carryings during the period of the agree-
ment exceeded its allotment and that it made payments into the pool. Delta
also contributed an excess. Lloyd was the chief beneficiary of those payments
since it carried the smallest percentage of the coffee and considerably less than
its allotment. Nopal argued the figures dearly entitled them to a larger share;
Lloyd remained adamant that it would not accept a lesser allocation than Nopal;
Delta suggested the parties retain the same quota as under the previous agree-
ment; Nopal objected and was summarily instructed by pool participants to take
it or leave it. Because of SUMOC 2o2, it had to "take it" in order to remain in
the trade. Thereafter, the agreement (No. 9040) was filed with the FMC for ap-
proval; Nopal filed a complaint alleging the agreement to be unjustly unfair
as between carriers in violation of section 15 of the Shipping Act of -19:6.
Nopal did not object to the Brazilian government policies, nor oppose the prin-
ciple of pooling embodied in the agreement, but challenged only what it consid-
ered an unreasonably low allocation of the trade.
Other "third flag" carriers who were participants in the Atlantic pool inter-
vened in the proceeding in support of Nopal and petitioned for a declaratory
order as to whether the FMC could approve a pool designed to accord "(a) pre-
ferred status to certain carriers because their vessels fly the flags of either the
importing or exporting nation ... and (b) in relation to those carriers, prej-
udiced status to certain other carriers because their vessels fly the flags of
other nations. .. ,,96 The Commission held that it could not.
7
94. Id. at ii.
95. Id. at %3.
96. Id. at 7. According to one report the Nopal litigation was "viewed as a test case to de-
termine the extent to which a U.S. regulatory agency would go to protect third flag carriers
in a U.S. trade." Journal of Commerce, July 23, %964, p. 24, col 5.
97. Id. at 21-22.
Cargo Preference and Flag Discrimination in International Shipping
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Commission found the agreement to be unjustly discriminatory in
violation of section 15. Its holding was based on the unfair method of cargo
allocations within the pool and not on the absolute monopoly in the coffee
trade effected by the combination of SUMOC 2o2 and the pooling agreement.
The Commission indicated that "if the quotas fixed under the agreement were
renegotiated and the agreement were modified in a manner not inconsistent
with this opinion, we would give further consideration to the matter of ap-
proval."98
The Brazilian Government was displeased with the Commission's decision
in the Nopal case was reported to have and threatened to bar third flag carriers
from its coffee trade." In August 1964, Brazil adopted an official policy favor-
ing the Brazilian flag and United States flag lines in the Brazil-United States
coffee trade.100 This would appear to be a windfall for the United States carriers
although the FMC reports that third flag carriers are still active in the trade be-
cause of insufficient space available aboard United States and Brazilian bot-
toms.
In the Nopal case, the FMC unanimously held that a pooling agreement
that allocates percentages of traffic on the basis of flag or national interest is
discriminatory as between carriers within the meaning of section 15. The
Commission acknowledged itself "bound by the Shipping Act to scrupulously
insure that all carriers regardless of flag are accorded equal treatment under
the laws we administer." 10 1 In such context, however, the FMC (within its
jurisdiction) is bound only to disapprove agreements between two or more
national flag carriers that are designed to exclude third flag carriers from com-
petition and that are executed in the absence of any compelling legislation,
regulations, or decrees of the United States and the other parent country.'1
0 2
This point is illustrated in River Plate and Brazil Conferences v. Lloyd Bra-
sileiro10 3 and in the following discussion of the Venezuela case. Pooling agree-
ments between national flag lines were the subject of both of these cases; the
results would be entirely inconsistent with the Commission's declaration in
98. Id. at 26.
99. Journal of Commerce, July 23, 1964, p. 24, col. 5.
zoo. Merchant Marine Commission of Brazil, Resolution No. 264o, Aug. 28, 1964.
%o. Report of the Commission, Northern Pan-American Line v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., FMC Docket No. %o96, July 2o, 1964, p. 21.
o102. The language of § z9 (i)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 995, as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 876(1) (b) (%964), appears broad enough to empower the PMC to impose
offsetting regulations in a case where, for example, a foreign government policy of restriction
of cargo to national flag vessels of the United States and the exporting country is injurious
to United States importers and detrimental to the commerce of the United States. But the
myriad problems of enforcement and adverse effect on foreign relations renders any such use
of § 19 (1)(b) extremely unlikely. Section z9 (i)(b) will continue to be used sparingly and only
in cases of discrimination against United States ships.
%o3. FMC Docket Nos. 92%, 928, May 25, 1965.
the Nopal case but for the existence of cargo preference laws on the part of
both parent countries.
The Venezuela Case
In 1959 the government of Venezuela decreed that commercial companies
under contract to any government agency for public works construction include
in their contracts a dause requiring materials to be imported aboard vessels of
the nationally-owned shipping line, Cia. Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion
(CAVN).104 About six months later, Venezuela increased its control over import
transportation, decreeing certain commodities exempt from payment of import
duties;10 5 this was referred to generally as "exonerated cargo." The initial decree
did not attempt to control the shipping of exonerated cargo; but a year later,
another decree imposed upon "exonerated cargo" a requirement that it be
shipped via CAVN or its associates as a prerequisite to exoneration.106
The determination of exoneration was discretionary with the Venezuelan
Minister of Development. The application for exoneration required the im-
porter to designate the carrier recommended to transport the commodity. A
copy of the application was sent to CAVN to inform it of the prospective ship-
ment and to give it opportunity to determine whether it had space available
for the cargo. Such a procedure "encouraged" the use of CAVN vessels by
shippers and importers and resulted in shippers booking all cargo on CAVN
vessels rather than attempting to distinguish exonerated from non-exonerated
commodities.
The Maritime Aministration determined that United States flag vessels
were not being extended "parity of treatment" in the Venezuelan trade and
refused to grant general waivers of P.R. 17 to allow CAVN to carry up to fifty
per cent of Venezuelan-bound cargoes financed by Eximbank credits. Not-
withstanding the objections of the United States, Venezuela extended its im-
port controls in 196r by requiring that all freight charges upon Venezuelan
imports included in an extensive "List of Importations of the Controlled Mar-
ket" (i.e., subject to import licensing) be paid in Venezuelan currency.'07 Non-
Venezuelan carriers were required to collect such freight charges in Venezuela
at an exchange rate fixed by the government; United States flag carriers could
exchange only a portion of the charges so paid for United States dollars at a
relatively unfavorable exchange rate.
Diplomatic pressure was ineffectual. United States maritime authorities
drafted retaliatory regulations pursuant to section 19(-c) (b) of the Merchant
io4. Venezuelan Governmental Circular No. %66, Sept. 28, %959. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Cia.
Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 7 F.M.C. 345, 376-77 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Alcoa S.S.
Co. v. FMC, 32% F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
%o5. Venezuelan Exec. Decree No. 255, March i8, 196o. See Alcoa, supra note %o4, at 376-
77.
106. Venezuelan Ministry of Development Decree No. 331, Feb. 9, 1961. See Alcoa, 7 F.M.C.
345,376-77 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. FMC, 321 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
107. Venezuelan Governmental Decree No. 480, March %7, %96%; Venezuelan Governmental
Decree No. 492, April 6, 1961. See Alcoa, supra note io6, at 376-77.
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Marine Act of 1920. These regulations were never published in the Federal
Register, but were delivered via diplomatic channels in hopes of reaching an
accord. The regulations listed the Federal Maritime Board's findings that the
exoneration decrees foreclosed United States flag and other vessels from com-
peting for cargo subject to exoneration and that the currency controls arbi-
trarily deprived exporters from the United States of control of the routing of
the items on the controlled market list.
The threatened sanctions produced quick action culminating in a pooling
agreement between CAVN and Grace Line, Inc.-the only United States flag
carrier serving the Venezuelan trade from United States Atlantic and Gulf
ports. The agreement, in effect, made Grace an "associate" of CAVN, thereby
making Grace eligible for carriage of "exonerated" cargo. This, in the eyes of
the United States maritime authorities, restored "parity of treatment" to
United States flag vessels (Grace being the sole American carrier affected by
the decrees) and re-established CAVN's eligibility for P. R. 17 waivers.
When submitted to the FMC for approval, the agreement was challenged
by operators of "third flag" vessels on the ground that the Grace-CAVN pool
would divert non-exonerated cargo from their vessels as well as the exoner-
ated cargo and cargoes subject to import licensing. 08 [The agreement merely
permitted Grace equal access to exonerated cargo and Grace was still subject
to exchange controls on import licensed items.] The FMC refuted the com-
plainants' contention, finding that only about twenty-five per cent of the total
United States to Venezuela traffic was subject to exoneration and that the third
flag carriers could compete for the balance of the trade.'0 9 According to the
Commission, it was "the fact that Grace alone is made an 'associate' that is
the crux of the controversy." There was indeed incentive for Grace and CAVN
to form an "equal access" pact since CAVN's eligibility to carry Eximbank
cargo to Venezuela would be restored. "To this [the 'third flag' carriers] can-
zo8. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Cia. Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 7 F.M.C. 345 (1962), aff'd
sub nom., Alcoa S.S. Co. v. FMC, 32% F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
109. The Commission's findings and conclusions on this point are somewhat contradictory
in light of the dire situation it found to have existed when United States carriers were not
equally eligible with CAVN for exonerated cargo. Although the FMC did find in the Alcoa
case that "by virtue of [the import licensing procedures and exchange controls] a sizeable
amount of shipments [move to Venezuela] on a freight collect basis," 7 F.M.C. at 353, it
seemed to brush off the problem stating, "Unless commodities on the import licensing list
have been exonerated... every carrier may compete for them. There is only a vague sug-
gestion that, since the control of routing tends to be exercised by consignees in Venezuela
there will, therefore, be a preference for the Venezuelan line as to this type of cargo." 7 F.M.C.
at 754. In its unpublished § 1 9 (i) (b) regulations, the FMC found that the Venezuelan exchange
controls "arbitrarily ... deprive exporters from the United States of control of the routing
of any imports [subject to licensing] and ... transfer[s] such control to Venezuelan importers,
without regard to normal freely competitive commercial practices, to the benefit of [CAVN]
and to the detriment of other carriers, including United States flag carriers...." 7 F.M.C. at
376-77.
not object, because the approval of this agreement has no bearing on their
ability to carry Export-Import Bank cargo.""10
In affirming the FMC's approval of the Grace-CAVN agreement, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the pooling
agreement was a by-product of the efforts of the two countries "to favor the
movement of a traffic in vessels flying their respective flags.""'
In effect, the agreement is a "private treaty" whereby foreign ships are
given access to United States government-controlled cargo in exchange for
making United States ships eligible for carriage of the foreign government-
controlled cargo. The FMC and the court reasoned that the objecting third
flag carriers were not eligible for the cargo before the pool was formed be-
cause of the respective governmental policies; thus, they can have no objection
to the pooling of such cargo on the ground that it discriminates against them."12
As with its cargo preference laws, the United States seems to be fostering an
undesirable trend in lending its approval to such agreements."'
The Cases of Ecuador and Uruguay
The two uses of retaliatory regulations authorized by section -i9(x)(b) of
Merchant Marine Act of r92o were precipitated by practices of Ecuador and
Uruguay.
In 1952, Ecuador levied an ad valorem invoice tariff fee of 8.5 per cent on
imports aboard Ecuadorian and Colombian flag vessels,114 while charging 9-5
m1o. Id. at 36o.
=L. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. FMC, 321 F.zd 756, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
112. But what if another United States flag carrier wants to participate in the trade but is
not admitted to the Grace-CAVN pool? Since such a carrier would not have equal access to
exonerated cargo, we would again have a situation wherein United States shipping is being
denied parity of treatment in the Venezuelan trade. The pool would have to "open up" to
accommodate another competing United States flag carrier. Other United States flag carriers
are now active in the Venezuelan trade and are seeking "associate" status along with Grace.
Waivers of P.R. 17 have been withheld from Venezuela since mid-19 64 pending restoration of
"parity of treatment" to all United States flag vessels. Dep't of State Memorandum Submitted
to the President's Maritime Advisory Committee, Aug. 1965, in Hearings Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the Shipping Restrictions on Grain Sales to Eastern Europe,
89 th Cong., %st Sess. 46 (1965).
13. "Another development which is being watched [by European shipowners] are [sic] car-
go arrangements between two countries in which their ships divide the two-way commerce in
such a way as to preclude any participation by third countries." Ozanne, Cargo Preferences
Hit European Lines, Journal of Commerce, Sept. 2, 1965, p.'23, col. 7.
For an earlier example of an "equal access" arrangement, see West Coast Line, Inc. v. Grace
Line, Inc., 3 F.M.B. 586 (1951). In %950, the Government of Chile inserted in its import li-
censes the requirement that, as to foreign ports served by the Chilean flag line, 5o% of the
cargo destined for Chile was to be shipped aboard Chilean vessels. Certain import items were
placed on the "free list" (i.e., not subject to import licensing) and shippers of such items were
free to select any carrier for those items. This policy (which was not limited to aid cargo) was
objectionable to the United States because it prevented United States ships from competing
for 50% of the "non-free list" cargo originating in the United States. The only United States
flag line serving the Chilean trade, Grace Line, Inc., entered into a pooling agreement with
the Chilean flag line, whereby Grace was granted "associate" status and was permitted to
participate in the carriage of cargo previously reserved to the Chilean flag. The pooling agree-
ment was approved by the FMB. Ships other than Chilean and United States flags remained
ineligible for carriage of 50% of Chile's "non-free list" imports from the United States.
14. The shipping company, La Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, is owned jointly by
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per cent on imports carried aboard ships of other registry-including the
United States. This, of course, encouraged shippers to use Ecuadorian and
Colombian ships. The United States tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a solu-
tion and finally imposed offsetting regulations pursuant to section r9(i) (b),
calling for an equalizing fee of one per cent of the f.o.b. value of goods bound
for Ecuador out of the United States and carried aboard Ecuadorian or Col-
ombian vessels." 5 The regulations forced discontinuance of the alleged dis-
crimination prior to their effective date."'
Similarly, in %963 the government of Uruguay established preferences for
imports shipped aboard Uruguayan national ships. Cargo so shipped was sub-
ject to a ten per cent surcharge based on c.i.f. value, whereas imports arriving
aboard ships of other registry were subject to a twenty per cent surcharge.
Certain cargoes that were exempt from the surcharge were relieved of a six
per cent tax levied by Uruguay on the "transfer of funds abroad" only if im-
ported aboard Uruguayan ships.
The FMC found that the Uruguayan preferences "artificially divert com-
mercial shipments to Uruguayan national flag vessels, discriminate against
vessels of the United States registry, and result in conditions which are detri-
mental to the free flow of international trade, thereby creating a condition un-
favorable to shipping in the foreign trade between the United States and Uru-
guay.""i7 When diplomatic pressure produced no results, equalizing charges
under section 19(1) (b) were imposed on Uruguayan ships leaving the United
States. The device was again most effective, and Uruguay agreed to dispense
with the surcharge and tax preference-at least for shipments aboard United
States flag vessels."'
In the case of Ecuador, regular notice of administrative rulemaling was
published in the Federal Register and hearings were scheduled. With respect
to Uruguay, the FMC availed itself of the power granted by section 4(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act" 9 and announced that "notice and public pro-
cedure would be contrary to the public interest because of the detrimental
effects to the commerce of the United States now being incurred as a result of
the discrimination of the Government of Uruguay.' 120 It is not likely that the
Uruguayan surcharges were really any more detrimental to the commerce of
Colombia and Ecuador and, excluding oil exports, Grancolombiana transports about one-third
of Colombia's foreign commerce. Wurfel, Foreign Enterprise in Colombia 71 (1965).
%15. 24 Fed. Reg. 5422-23 (1959).
1x6. 25 Fed. Reg. o52 (196o).
117. 29 Fed. Reg. 16195 (1964). See 46 C.F.R. § 506.4 (Supp. 1965).
1=8. The regulations remain in effect officially but enforcement is suspended pending
action on the repeal of the surcharges by the Uruguayan legislature.
119. 6o Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1oo3(a) (1964).
%2o. 29 Fed. Reg. 16195 (1964).
the United States than were the consular fees charged by Ecuador. Judging by
the quick remedial results, the FMC has discovered an effective ultimatum. It
can be expected that, if and when the FMC issues section t9(i) (b) regula-
tions in the future, it will do so without giving interested parties an oppor-
tunity to delay the effective date of the regulations pending an administrative
hearing.
Other Countries
Argentina, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Arab Republic have all been subject to
United States diplomatic pressure because of discriminatory shipping laws or
policies. For the most part, the devices employed by these countries are simi-
lar to those discussed above.121 Although some of these preferential polices re-
late only to cargoes moving for account of the particular government and its
agencies or corporations, others require a certain percentage (up to ioo per
cent) of all their imports to be carried by their national flag ships.
In most instances, United States carriers have not complained of discrimina-
tion under these laws since they either are not enforced or do not operate to
the detriment of United States shipping. None of the policies in this particu-
lar group has been found so discriminatory to United States shipping to war-
rant the use of section %9(1) (b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 920.122 How-
ever, P.R. 17 waivers have been withheld or restricted in some cases pending
restoration of "parity of treatment" to United States flag vessels in the par-
ticular trade.
Some Observations
Development of Regional Operating Companies
The developing countries that heretofore have depended upon the established
maritime powers for carriage of their ocean trade, and that have had little or
no choice but to pay liner rates fixed by the various international shipping con-
ferences--rates apparently limited only by what the traffic will bearl 23-under-
standably are seeking relief. As noted at the beginning of this article, the chronic
shortage of foreign exchange experienced by most developing countries coupled
with a desire to decrease the landed cost of essential imports incline many to seek
(but not always to achieve) alleviation of these problems by establishing their
own merchant fleets.
An underdeveloped maritime nation seeking to enter the international ship-
ing trade with only a few inefficient ships not only must face the difficulty of
%2%. See Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Discriminatory Practices and
Laws of Foreign Nations Adversely Affecting United States Flag Shipping (Comm. Print
1962); Journal of Commerce, Sept. 13, 1965, p. 25, col. 4; Dep't of State Memorandum, supra
note 112, at 43-46.
122. 4% Stat. 995, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 87 6(%)(b) (1964).
123. Douglas Report 8. See also 1964 House Hearings %21.
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breaking into the market on a competitive basis, but must anticipate the high
costs of manning, maintaining, operating, replacing, and augmenting its
merchant fleet. In many cases, the drain of foreign exchange necessary to es-
tablish and operate an ocean transportation industry overshadows the pos-
sibility of anticipated exchange savings or earnings." 4 A country with only a
few ships in its registry capable of operating internationally could not seri-
ously hope to have any significant impact on its own trade or economy; the
smaller and more vulnerable a country's merchant fleet, the more there is pres-
sure from within to protect the national fleet by discriminating in its favor.
To such countries and to their more affluent but underdeveloped neighbors
determined to establish their own merchant fleets, the concept of regional as
opposed to strictly national merchant marines may afford one of the "sound
economic criteria" essential to a merchant fleet.
The combination by friendly nations of ships, capital, and personnel in a
single multi-national operating unit could create a legitimately competitive
merchant fleet dedicated to the best interests of the region it serves. What
might be termed a "multi-flag joint service," properly financed and operated,
should be able to offer to area importers and other shippers competitive rates
payable in any of the currencies of the participating nations. Ships of the
multi-flag joint service could coordinate schedules to avoid competing with
one another for cargo in the various ports of call and to maximize use of ship
space; uninterrupted service could be maintained during periods of temporary
congestion in regional ports with less pressure for surcharges 25 or unilateral
rate increases; tonnage could be added to the service at a controlled rate based
on availability of cargo and the needs of the particular region.
Most importantly, these and other advantages can be realized without re-
course to artificial cargo quotas or other discriminatory devices. The emphasis
124. A new shipping line seeking to operate independently must also anticipate efforts by
the conference lines serving the area to drive it from the trade. Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 635,
636-37 (965).
125. A surcharge is a temporary rate increase on shipments to a particular port ostensibly
to offset extraordinary costs of serving that port due to congestion, labor difficulties, civil
disturbances, etc. However, surcharges are often threatened or levied not only to offset the
increased costs alleged by the carriers, but also as "leverage" devices to induce port authorities
to take corrective action. The amount of surcharge is usually stated in terms of a percentage
of existing rates or as a fixed amount of money. It is usually difficult to detect any correlation
between increased costs alleged by the carriers and the amount of surcharge levied. Compare
Report of the Commission, Imposition of Surcharge on Cargo to Manila, FMC Docket No.
1155, Feb. 3, %965, with Initial Decision, Pakistan v. The India, Pakistan, Ceylon & Burma
Outward Freight Conference, FMC Docket No. 1176, Sept. 2, 1964. The latter case was
rendered moot by order of the Commission on Sept. E6, 1965, which dismissed the proceeding
without a decision because the surcharges complained of were no longer in effect. Thus, the
question whether the amount of a surcharge must be reasonably related to the carriers' alleged
increased costs has yet to be answered by the FMC.
is properly placed upon making a merchant fleet competitive rather than seek-
ing to assure its success by insulating it from competition.
The concept of regional operating companies has already found favor with
several countries: Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey agreed in July 1965 to establish
a regional joint service for trade between the member countries.126 Eventually,
the service is to be extended to the United States trade. There has been no in-
dication whether Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey will employ cargo preferences to
support the newly established service.
A bilateral shipping agreement between India and the United Arab Re-
public was put into effect in January c965. The agreement generally estab-
lishes a joint shipping service to operate between the two countries, but un-
fortunately reserved cargo to Indian and Egyptian ships on a fifty-fifty basis.12 7
American flag vessels operating in the same trade objected to being closed out
and were offered a share of twenty per cent of the India-United Arab Re-
public traffic, with those two countries each reserving forty per cent shares.
This accommodation has not been entirely satisfactory to the United States;
the Maritime Administration has placed a partial restriction on P.R. 17 waiv-
ers for Indian vessels.128
Member nations of the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
have sponsored a group known as the Association Latin Americana de Arma-
dores (Alamar), representing the shipping companies of Brazil, Colombia,
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 29 This, how-
ever, is a group of national flag companies, not a single operating unit as was
established by Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. In response to reports that the
governments of Alamar members were considering proposals to declare the
intra-LAFTA trade "domestic" and therefore reserved exclusively to Alamar
ships, the United States has warned that it would take corrective steps if
United States flag vessels were precluded from competing for LAFTA area cargo
on the same basis as Alamar members.80
Legitimate Promotional Features
It can hardly be suggested that developing countries must eschew any pro-
motion of their national or regional merchant marines. Seafaring nations have
for centuries encouraged and supported their merchant fleets. Today, there
are few, if any, maritime nations that do not assist their shipping and ship-
building industries through some combination of government ownership,
direct operating subsidies, and indirect encouragement, such as favorable tax
rates and depreciation allowances, low interest loans, and reservation of do,
126. Pakistan Times, July 19, 1965, p. 1, col. 7. The new venture has been referred to as
the "RCD service"-the initials standing for Regional Cooperation and Development.
127. Interviews With Officials of the Department of State and the Maritime Administra-
tion in Washington, D.C., October %965. Only Indian ships are as yet active in the trade.
128. Ibid. P.R. 17 waivers are being granted Indian vessels for only zo% of Eximbank-
financed cargo destined for India instead of the usual 5o%.
129. Journal of Commerce, Sept. 3, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
130. Ibid. See also Journal of Commerce, Sept. 8, 1965, p. 4, col. I.
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mestic, coastal trade to national flag ships.13' These features generally are ac-
cepted in the world shipping trade as nondiscriminatory means of equalizing
competitive disparities, especially in terms of operating costs. 132 However, the
moment cargo preference is applied to international trade, charges and coun-
tercharges dart back and forth over the oceans, and the complete breakdown
of international shipping invariably is predicted.
Use of national flag vessels by shippers and importers, however, can be
legitimately encouraged without official policies compelling such use. To draw
a distinction between legitimate promotional features and "Balkanizing" cargo
preference, it will be helpful to distinguish between the types of cargo to which
such promotion is directed or to which preference is applied: commercial cargo,
government-influenced cargo, government-controlled aid shipments, and gov-
ernment-shipped cargo.
Commercial Cargo. Commercial cargo may be defined as cargo moving pursuant
to private importer and exporter contracts; it is subject to no restrictions (other
than normal import duties) of either the country of origin or the country of des-
tination. Most of the cargo moving in the non-communist world trade comes
within this definition. Maritime nations should avoid placing any restrictions on
the free movement of such trade. Nations wishing to attract such cargo to their
vessels should encourage their shipping lines to offer reliable, efficient, and
reasonably priced service rather than reserving by decree any portion of the
country's commercial trade to national flag vessels. Use of the national (or
regional) merchant marine may be encouraged through a "Ship National
Flag" campaign directed at local importers and exporters, emphasizing the
savings in foreign exchange realized by use of national flag vessels.
Government-Influenced Cargo. As illustrated above, nations often seek to com-
pel routing of cargo aboard ships of their own flag by requiring certain imports
to be licensed; the license then requires that shipment be made aboard one of its
national flag vessels. Another device is to make foreign exchange available to
importers on the contingency that national flag vessels be used. Although a par-
ticular government may have legitimate policy reasons for restricting imports
and controlling its balance of payments, the commodities to which such restric-
tions are directed would, but for the restrictions, be strictly commercial cargo. A
government seeking to reserve cargo to its national flag vessels by such devices
could apply such "influence" to as much as ioo per cent of its foreign trade.
Therefore, discrimination in favor of the national flag line should be avoided.
The outside limit of international toleration of flag preference covering gov-
13%. Subsidies to Shipping by Eleven Countries 4.
232. Ibid.
eminent-influenced cargo is suggested by the cases of Brazil and Venezuela
discussed above. Foreign exchange was made available to importers only for
the f.o.b. value of certain licensed imports; freight was made payable in local
currency on a collect basis. The use of such a device could be justified only if
licensing and exchange control were required for national policy reasons apart
from the desire to encourage use of the national merchant fleet. Operators of for-
eign flag vessels delivering such "influenced" cargo would have to be assured
the right to convert local currency to dollars or other hard currency at the regu-
lar free market rate of exchange. Standing alone, the licensing and exchange
controls would encourage use of national flag vessels, but would not require it.
Government-Controlled Aid Shipments. Most developing nations of the free
world participate in foreign assistance programs of the United States. If we ac-
cept as reasonable and non-discriminatory the cargo preference rules embodied
in P.R. -7 and the Cargo Preference Act, should we not recognize also that the
aid-recipient nations may reserve the non-United States flag portion of such
cargoes to their own national or regional merchant marines? Can the United
States seriously allege discrimination in such a practice where the aid recipient's
policy simply mirrors that of the lender?
Certainly the aid-recipient is interested in getting the most tangible ben-
efits from commodity loans it must eventually repay. If foreign exchange can
be conserved in the transportation of commodities, more dollars will be avail-
able for purchase in the United States of those commodities. Heretofore, aid
recipient countries have tended to use United States flag vessels for transpor-
tation of aid cargoes in excess of the required fifty per cent. This results from
AID's refusal to finance transportation costs when shipment is aboard foreign
flag vessels. The recipient elects to pay the higher freight rates for United
States flag vessels to keep intact its own foreign exchange reserves.
Assuming that vessels of the aid-recipient are available for transportation
of such United States-financed cargoes at rates lower than or even the same as
those charged for United States flag vessels, and assuming further that freight
costs would be payable in the currency of the aid-recipient, the competitive ad-
vantage with respect to non-reserved cargo would seem to be with the national
flag vessels without need for government-sponsored cargo preference.
When Eximbank cargoes are shipped, of course, the foreign country is en-
titled to carry half such cargoes aboard its own vessels if general waivers are
allowed by the Maritime Administration.
Government-Shipped Cargo. When a government ships or imports for its own
account, it can, as can any individual, specify terms to retain the right to desig-
nate the carrier. In this situation, a government could be expected to prefer its
own merchant marine over its foreign competitors. Such a practice would seem
objectionable only if the character of government cargo is ascribed to what
would in substance be commercial cargo.
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Conclusions
There is obviously at present no easy and universally acceptable solution
to the spreading problems of cargo preference among less developed as well
as developed maritime nations. When objectively considered, a government-
sponsored preference system that artificially diverts cargo to national flag ves-
sels is a poor foundation upon which to build or maintain a competitive and
economically feasible merchant fleet. Moreover, the spread of cargo prefer-
ence on a country-by-country basis, with its inevitable retaliations and "equal
access" deals, will indeed disrupt international trade and increase friction
among nations. What is required is a reversal of the present trend toward
these restrictive trade practices and a return (gradual if necessary) to what
may be considered more normal competition for cargo in the international
shipping industry. The United States should assume the lead.
